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Aquinas on Aristotle on
Happiness
D O N ADAMS
The first nine books of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
(EN) seem to present a complex theory of happiness. In them, it
seems that happiness is a good that is composed of several goods, e.g.,
friends, wealth, political and social honors, and so on. There seems
now to be a consensus that this is indeed Aristotle's considered view of
happiness.ι I agree with this consensus.
Given that the first nine books of the EN seem so clearly to suggest
this active view of happiness, it seems odd that in his commentary on
i. See the following: J. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 99; D. Keyt, "Intellectualism in Aris-
totle," Paideia, Special Aristotle Issue (1978): 138-157; J. Whiting, "Human Nature
and Intellectualism in Aristotle," Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 68 (1986): 70—
95; J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle on Eudaimonia," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics> edited by
A. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 15-33; T. H. Irwin,
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985); Irwin, "Permanent Hap-
piness: Aristotle and Solon," in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3, edited by J.
Annas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 89-124; Irwin, "Stoic and
Aristotelian Conceptions of Happiness," in The Norms of Nature, edited by M.
Schofield and G. Striker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 205-
244; A. W. Price, "Aristotle's Ethical Holism," Mind 89 (1980): 341; M. Nussbaum,
"Aristotle," in Ancient Writers 1, edited by T. James Luce (New York: Scribner,
1982), p. 403; D. Devereux, "Aristotle on the Essence of Happiness," in Studies in
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the EN,2 St. Thomas Aquinas attributes to Aristotle a view quite
similar to his own contemplative view of happiness. In this essay I
intend to show that while Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle3 is
incorrect, it is philosophically interesting, textually well motivated,
and guilty of no interpretative crimes.
I begin by pointing out two early symptoms of the difference be-
tween Aristotle's views and the views that Aquinas attributes to Aris-
totle. Next, I clarify the character of the two different conceptions of
happiness and raise a serious problem for Aquinas's attempt to at-
tribute to Aristotle a view of happiness so similar to his own. Finally, I
show the textual root of the difference between Aristotle's views and
Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle's views and show that given the
text Aquinas had, and given the burden of interpreting Aristotle
sympathetically, Aquinas's interpretation is guilty of no interpretative
crimes.
TWO SYMPTOMS OF DIFFERENCE
Aquinas follows Aristotle in arguing that happiness is
a complete (teleia, perfectus) and self-sufficient (autarkes, per se suffi-
dens) good (EN 1.7.1097a25-bl5, EA L9 no.107).4
COMPLETENESS
At the end of EN 1.10 Aristotle admits that the happi-
ness which can be attained in this life is subject to chance. Even
Aristotle, edited by D. J. O'Meara (Washington: The Catholic University of America
Press, 1981), p. 249f. Two recent dissenters from this consensus are Robert Heina-
man, "Eudaimonia and Self-Sufficiency in the Nicomachean Ethics," Phronesis 33
(1987): 31-53; and Richard Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1989). Heinaman's reasons for dissenting bear little relation to
Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle, so I shall not respond to Heinaman here. I shall,
however, respond briefly to Kraut in note 31, below.
2. I shall use "EA" to refer to Aquinas's commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle. For
ease of citation, I will use both the medieval textual divisions and the section numbers
originally assigned by Cathala, as reproduced in in decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad
Nicomachum expositio, 3d ed., edited by Raymundus M. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti,
1964). All translations of Aristotle and Aquinas are mine.
3. I do not intend to look carefully at the first five questions of Summa theologiae
(hereafter ST) 1-2, which could also be considered to be a type of commentary on
EN.
4. Aquinas takes b 16-20 to be a further explanation of self-sufficiency and not to
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someone as prosperous as Priam can be denied happiness because of
serious misfortune* (Although misfortune cannot make one unhappy,
it can deprive one of some external goods required for complete happi-
ness.)5 This does not commit Aristotle to the view that happiness is a
radically unstable or ephemeral thing, since it takes serious misfortune
to take one's happiness away. Aquinas does recognize that Aristotle
does not think "a person is happy in the way of a chameleon" (1.15
no. 186) and sees that this does not by itself entail that happiness is
radically unstable. Nevertheless Aquinas does think that Aristotle
accepts that once we admit that the happiness to be obtained in this
life can be taken away by misfortune, we must accept that it cannot be
truly complete. Aquinas says, ubut because these things do not seem
always to measure up to the conditions for happiness laid down
above," i.e., completeness and self-sufficiency, as in EA 1.9 nos. 104-
117, "he adds that the sort of people we call happy as human beings,
who in this life are subject to change, cannot have complete happi-
ness" (EA 1.16 no. 202). It is the mutability of this life that, accord-
ing to Aquinas, rules out even the possibility of its being complete in
the relevant sense. (Aquinas takes two different lines in different
places about what the relevant sort of mutability is. I will return to this
point below.)
This is an odd comment for Aquinas to make for two reasons: first,
nowhere in the passage he is commenting upon does Aristotle ex-
plicitly deny human beings the ability to attain complete happiness in
this life; but, second, the point of Aristotle's argument seems to be
exactly the opposite.6 Aristotle asks rhetorically:
What, therefore, prevents us from calling happy the one who acts accord-
ing to complete virtue and is thoroughly and sufficiently supplied with
external goods not for a short time but in a complete life? . . . we lay it
down that happiness is the end and is always complete in every way. But if
be a third feature of happiness. Taking it this way is at least strongly recommended by
b20-21.
5. For one explanation of how this can be so, see Irwin, "Permanent Happiness,"
pp. 89-124.
6. If in book 10 Aristotle clearly claims that the active life can never be as
complete as the contemplative life, there would be good reason to try to interpret this
passage in the way Aquinas does. I shall return below to Aristotle's discussion of the
contemplative life in book 10.
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it is so, we will call blessed a living human being to whom belongs and will
belong the things we have said, but happy as a human being.7
The point here seems clearly to be that while complete happiness is
difficult to attain in this life, it is possible—however difficult it might
be to attain complete virtue and sufficient external goods or to avoid
misfortunes.
In defending his interpretation, Aquinas may point out that Aris^
totle does say that when one is happy in the way he is discussing, one
is happy "as a human being." Surely in saying this he is acknowledging
at least that there may be another way of being happy (compare EA
1.16 no. 202; 1.9 no. 113). But to justify his interpretation, Aquinas
must show that according to Aristotle (1) there is another way of
being happy which (2) has a better claim on being called complete
and which (3) we can, at least theoretically, achieve.8 Aristotle ac-
cepts claim 1 since he believes that the happiness of the gods is
different from human happiness (compare EN 7.14.1154b26—31; and
Metaphysics 12.7.1072bl4-20). We will see that Aquinas also at-
tributes claims 2 and 3 to Aristotle.
SELF-SUFFICIENCY
Aquinas follows Aristotle in holding that a good is self-
sufficient if and only if it provides everything that is by itself necessary
and sufficient for making a life "choiceworthy, lacking in nothing"
7. In this section (EN 1.10.1100b33-1101a21), Aristotle seems to be using
"happy" (eudaimόn) and "blessed" (makarios) interchangeably (compare especially
1100b33—34 with 1101a6-8). Aquinas appears to follow him, using felix and beatus
interchangeably (see especially EA 1.15 no. 185). Compare also 1099b9—18 and
1098al9. In his comment on this last passage (EA 1.10 no. 129) Aquinas explicitly
mentions that "in praesenti vita non potest esse perfecta felicitas" but nowhere uses
beatus or any of its cognates, which he should do if it were important for him to
distinguish the beatus from the felix,
8. By condition 3, I mean two things: (3a) it is logically possible for some person to
be happy in that other way, and (3b) it is logically possible for such a person to be
numerically identical to someone who is a human being. Perhaps conditions 1 and 2
by themselves could help show that some nonhuman person is not completely happy,
but without conditions 3a and 3b, they cannot show that the happiness of some
human being is not complete. Even if neither Aquinas nor Aristotle assumes that
complete happiness is logically possible, conditions 1 and 2 without 3a and 3b will not
count as evidence that a human being leading the active life on earth is not com-
pletely happy.
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(EA 1.9 no. 114; compare EN 1.7.1097bl4-15). This is ambiguous,
depending upon how we construe the subsequent few lines. I follow
Irwin9 in thinking that Aristotle takes it in the following way:
[Happiness] is the most choiceworthy of all, not being merely one good
among many—if it were merely one good among many, then clearly it
would be made more choiceworthy by the addition of the least of goods,
[but since it is the most choiceworthy, the addition of the least of goods
will not make it more choiceworthy, so happiness is not merely one good
among many].
This is the inclusive sense of self-sufficiency: if G
x
 by itself makes a life
choiceworthy, but a life with G
x
 is made more choiceworthy by the
addition of G 2 , then G 3 (let G 3 = Gι + G 2 ) is more self-sufficient
than either G
ι
 or G 2 -
1 0
According to Aquinas, there are two different ways in which some-
thing can be said to be self-sufficient. The first way is the inclusive
way just mentioned. "In one way, a complete [perfectum] good is said
to be self-sufficient if it cannot receive an augmentation of good
through the addition of any good thing" (EA 1.9 no. 115). In this
sense, the self-sufficient good G is the one that already includes all
token goods which, if added to G, would augment the goodness of
G. Aquinas thinks that the only being in the universe that is self-
sufficient in this way is God (EA 1.9 no. 115).
The second way in which a good can be said to be self-sufficient,
according to Aquinas, is exclusive.
By itself, nothing else included, [a self-sufficient good] is sufficient insofar
as it contains everything that a human being needs of necessity . . .
nevertheless, if it is included together with anything else even minimally
good, clearly it will be more choiceworthy. This is because through addi-
tion there is a superabundance or augmentation of good. So the more good
a thing is, the more choiceworthy it is. (EA 1.9 nos. 115-116)
This is an exclusive sense of self-sufficiency. Suppose G
x
 is a self-
sufficient good and suppose that the addition of G 2 makes Gι more
9. Irwin, "Permanent Happiness," p. 93.
10. What Aristotle says at 10.2.1172b28—34 appears to, but need not really,
support the inclusive interpretation. In this passage Aristotle may be saying only that
the good cannot be made better by the addition of a new type of good thing. This does
not commit him to the view that the good cannot be made better by the addition of a
new token good thing, the view to which I take the inclusive interpretation to
commit him.
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choice worthy. We now have two self-sufficient goods, G
λ
 and G 3
(where G 3 = G x + G 2 ). Both G x and G 3, therefore, provide all the
"necessities of life," but G
x
 is more self-sufficient than G 3, according
to Aquinas, because it does not require G 2 . G 3 depends upon having
G 2 in addition to Gv whereas G x is not dependent on the extra G 2 .
The idea here, presumably, is something like this. Select a person,
S, whom Aristotle would be willing to call happy. S has everything
necessary for happiness, so S's life is self-sufficient and choiceworthy.
Suppose now that in fact S has one million dollars, which S uses for
admirable public works, benefitting friends, and so on. It seems clear
that it would be an additional good for S to possess an additional
million dollars, for S could then sponsor more or greater public works,
more greatly benefit more friends, and so on. However, by hypothesis,
this additional million is not necessary for S to be happy. So S's life
with the extra million is better, and hence more choiceworthy, than
S's life without the extra million. But since we said that S's life
without the extra million was a happy life, it turns out that some state
is more choiceworthy than the state of being happy.
Given such a story, the inclusive view seems wildly implausible. On
the inclusive view we must either accept that the additional million
does augment the goodness of S's life, but deny that S was happy
without the additional million; or accept that S was happy without the
extra million, and deny that the extra million augments the goodness
of S's life. Both options seem implausible. I would like next to try to
make the inclusive view seem less implausible.
THE INCLUSIVE VIEW
A clean and well-made pair of shoes is a good thing. In
modern city life, one needs several such good things in order to lead a
happy life. If I had no shoes, it would make my life better were a
decent pair of shoes to be added to my life. A second decent pair of
shoes also might make my life better. From this, however, it does not
follow that it is always the case that another decent pair of shoes will
make my life that much better. It is not always true that if n good
things improve one's life by n degrees, then n + 1 good things improve
one's life by n + J degrees. There comes a point, at least with respect
to shoes, when enough is enough. This must be true because there is
such a thing as having too many shoes. There is a number of pairs of
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shoes n such that having n pairs of shoes actually makes one's life a bit
worse than if one were to have significantly fewer than n shoes. But
here I must make an important exception.
If I had nothing at least as important to do as clean and organize my
shoe collection, then perhaps I would always count an extra pair of
shoes as an improvement of my life. However, if I do happen to have
other things to do which are at least as important as maintaining my
shoe collection, then there comes a point where maintaining that
collection takes time away from other worthwhile projects, making my
life worse. Or, if I fail to maintain the collection, the clutter makes it
difficult to get anything done in my apartment, thus making my life
worse. It is possible to have too much of a good thing. Well and good
for shoes, but how about for a million dollars?
Perhaps it never hurts to have a little more money. However, the
fact that x never hurts does not entail that x always helps. By hypoth-
esis, S was happy without the extra million. Now we give S an extra
million, and clearly we have not hurt S or made S's life worse. But
have we really improved S's life? Before getting the extra million, S
had more to do with her time than simply spend money on friends and
noble public works. Where will S find the time to spend the extra
million? But perhaps time is not the problem. Perhaps S will take
exactly the same amount of time spending money, but during that
time S will plan larger, more expensive public works, give more to the
same friends, and so on. In this case, isn't more necessarily better?
Clearly not.
It is quite true that the virtuous person will work for her friends and
her country, and will sacrifice her money and be willing even to
sacrifice her life for them (EN 9.8.1169a20). However, she will also
be willing to sacrifice actions to her friends or her country, allowing
others to perform noble deeds themselves (EN 9.8.1169a33). Perhaps
it never hurts a magnificent person to receive more money, but the
magnificent person may never use some of the extra money. The
magnificent person knows when and how much not to spend as well as
when and how much to spend (EN 4-2.1123a20-27). But we need
not think of such extreme circumstances.
There is a second reason why it is not true that the greater the
public work is, the better the magnificent act is. A magnificent act
must be "fitting," but what is "fitting" is determined relative to the
giver (EN 4.2.1122a25 and b25). Surely a magnificent person gives
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readily and easily, without counting every penny (1122b7), but she
also does not overreach her budget. She spends what is "fitting." But
so does the magnificent person with twice as much money as S. They
are both doing what is fine and "fitting" on a grand scale—Aristotle
does not tell us just how grand the scale must be in order to count as a
magnificent work—and so they are both doing perfectly magnificent
things. Consequently, if S has one million, and P has two million, P's
public works may be on a grander scale than S's, but that does not
entail that P is more magnificent than S, and so it does not entail that
P's life is any better than S's.
Now the inclusive view may not seem so implausible. Suppose that
S is happy, and that S's net worth is one million dollars. Since she is
happy, she must be exercising all the virtues. She is engaging in large,
noble public works, she helps out her friends and family, she takes care
of her own business, goes to parties and other social gatherings, and
she takes time off to relax, enjoy the company of her friends, and to
study. Now we give S a second million dollars. I assume we have not
made her life worse. Have we really improved it? Before she was
exercising her virtues to the fullest, benefitting her friends and the
community in large and small ways. Afterwards she continues to ex-
ercise the virtues to the fullest, benefitting her friends and the com-
munity in large and small ways. It looks as if the change in her life is
superficial and does not make it any better. Of course there is room for
intuitions to differ here, but I hope this at least makes the inclusive
view seem less implausible than it did at first.
If this does help the theory of happiness that Aristotle lays out in
book 1 of the Ethics, we might nevertheless wonder how to square it
with Aristotle's claims in book 10 about what he thinks can actually
instantiate the concept of happiness.x ι In book 10 Aristotle appears to
accept the exclusive interpretation of self-sufficiency when it comes to
describing the actual sort of life which would instantiate happiness.
He seems to say that the contemplative life is preferable to the active
life because it is more self-sufficient, in spite of the fact that in the
11. We can distinguish between the concept of self-sufficiency and what in fact
Aristotle thinks instantiates the concept of self-sufficiency. In fact, however, I think
that Irwin is right about how to translate EN 1097bl4-15, and so I think that even in
book 1, Aristotle does not sit on the fence about self-sufficiency, but states the
inclusive view.
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contemplative life, one must give up many choiceworthy things.12 I
will turn to this issue soon, but there is another to be taken up first. 1
have already explained what a completely happy life might look like
on the inclusive view of self-sufficiency. What might it look like on an
exclusive view?
TYPES OF HAPPINESS
A good is complete if and only if it is always chosen
for its own sake and never for the sake of something else (EN
1.7.1097a30-34; EA 1.9 nos. 109-111). In this sense, according to
Aquinas, someone who has attained her complete good has attained
the "ultimate terminus of the natural motion of desire," and so she
must not be merely potential in any relevant way, but must have all of
her potentialities fully actualized (1.9 no. 107). While it is not obvi-
ous that Aristotle understands completeness in just this way, he does
believe that a happy person must be completely actual in this sense
because he believes that happiness consists in fulfilling one's nature.
But here we must draw a few distinctions.
ACTUALITY AND POTENTIALITY
Consider someone who knows nothing of French or
Mandarin. If she is of normal intelligence, then she has the capacity
to learn both languages. Call this capacity a "first potentiality."13 Now
suppose she learns both French and Mandarin. She has exercised her
first potentiality and has a developed capacity that explains why, for
example, she knows what the Mandarin word for "chair" is. Call this
actualized first potentiality her "first actuality." This first actuality,
however, is also a potentiality, since in virtue of knowing French and
Mandarin, she has the capacity to speak either language at will. So the
first actuality is the "second potentiality." Finally, when she is actually
12. Specifically at EN 10.7.1177al5 and 1178a2 Aristotle appears to make such
claims. Aquinas takes advantage of these passages in EA 10.10 nos. 2080-2086 and
2107-2110 to attribute the exclusive view to Aristotle. I argue below that this is a
reasonable interpretation of Aristotle, provided that we can attribute to Aristotle the
view that someone numerically identical to me could be completely fulfilled without
living the active life.
13. For these distinctions, see Aristotle's On the Soul 2.1, 2.5; Metaphysics 4.3,
4.5, 4.7-8, 5.12, 5.20; and Aquinas's ST 1-2.49.
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speaking French or Mandarin, she is actualizing her second poten-
tiality; call this the "second actuality/'
Since there are two kinds of actuality, there are two ways of being
perfectly actual: (1) being actualized in all of one's first potentiali-
ties but not all of one's second potentialities (call this "perfectly 1-
actuaΓ), and (2) being actualized in all of one's second potentialities
(call this "perfectly 2-actual").14 Cutting across this distinction is a
threefold temporal distinction: is one perfectly actual only over a
period of time, or is one perfectly actual all at once though imperma-
nently, or is one perfectly actual at a time and permanently? In the
previous example it is clear that no one can be perfectly 2-actual at a
time, permanently or impermanently. It is impossible to be speaking
both French and Mandarin at the same time (for any length of time,
let alone permanently). One can, however, be perfectly 2-actual over
time: one can first speak French, and then Mandarin. One can be
perfectly 1-actual both at a time and over time: I can have a fully
developed character with all the relevant first potentialities devel-
oped, or I might lose certain character traits while developing others,
so that I have developed each first potentiality at some time, though
there has never been a time when all of them were actualized simulta-
neously.
Since Aquinas and Aristotle accept that happiness requires perfect
actualization, we must ask which of the four kinds of perfect actualiza-
tion they require. It is clear that both think being perfectly 1-actual is
not enough, for one can be perfectly 1-actual and spend most of one's
life asleep or in a coma, in which case one surely would not be happy
(EN 1102a32-bl2; EA nos. 231-235).15 So both think that happi-
ness requires being perfectly 2-actual. Which type of being perfectly
2-actual does Aquinas think happiness requires?
We saw earlier that Aquinas attributes to Aristotle the belief that
mutability rules out even the possibility of a life's being complete. In
different places Aquinas understands this mutability differently. In his
14. This definition of "perfectly 2-actuaΓ is ambiguous. One satisfies this defini-
tion by actualizing all of one's second potentialities even if one has not actualized all
of one's first potentialities. When I use "perfectly 2'actual," I will mean one who has
actualized all of her or his first potentialities.
15. See also EN 1.8.1098b30-1099a7; EA 1.10 nos. 119 and 123-130, 1.12 nos.
152-153, 10.9 no. 2066.
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commentary on the EN, Aquinas is fairly clear that the relevant sort
of mutability is the possibility that one will change from being happy
to being not happy (EA 1.16 nos. 201-202; L10 129). Because hu-
man happiness requires external goods, and because it is always pos-
sible that severe misfortune will take those goods away, it is always
possible (in this life) to change from being happy to being unhappy.
Aquinas also mentions that continuity is necessary for happiness (EA
L10 no. 129). Because this life will end, we cannot have perfect
continuity in this life, hence we cannot have perfect happiness.
Aquinas employs different notions of mutability and continuity in
the ST. At ST 1-2.3.2 ad 4, Aquinas cites EN 1.10 (the passage he
expounds in EA 1.16 nos. 201-202) to support his claim that much
stronger sorts of mutability and continuity rule out the possibility of
our being perfectly happy in this life.
In human beings, as regards the condition of this present life, the final
perfection accords with an activity by which a human is joined to God; but
this activity cannot be continuous. Consequently, neither is it unique,
because an activity is multiplied by being discontinued, and on account of
this, in the condition of this present life, perfect happiness cannot be
possessed by a human being. . . . Consequently the active life, which is
occupied with many things, fits the definition of happiness less than the
contemplative life which is occupied with one thing.
Here it is clear that the discontinuity is, for example, the fact that we
have to leave off exercising one virtue in order to exercise another (or
to sleep, for which see ST 1-2.3.2 ad 6 which Aquinas claims to have
answered in ad 4)- This is significantly different from the view taken
in the EA. We might express this difference in the terminology intro-
duced above by saying that in the ST, the fact that we cannot attain
perfect 2-actuality at a time permanently or impermanently (but at
best only perfect 2-actuality over time)1 6 by itself rules out the possi-
bility of our being perfectly happy.17 While the EA never suggests any
such criterion, it does not explicitly rule it out either. Before we go
16. I cannot exercise all of my developed capacities at the same time (perfect
2-actuality at a time) but only over time. I cannot exercise all the virtues at once;
rather, I must exercise first one, then cease exercising that one and then exercise
another and so on (perfect 2-actuality over time).
17. This seems to be what underlies Pegis's interpretation of Aquinas's commen-
tary on Aristotle. See Anton Pegis, "St. Thomas and the Nicomachean Ethics: Some
Reflections on Summa contra gentiles III, 44, 5," Mediaeval Studies 25 (1963): 1-25.
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any further, we should examine what reason someone might have for
preferring perfect 2-actuality at some time, permanently or imperma'
nently, over perfect 2-actuality only over time.
HAPPINESS AND DESIRE
Alan Donagan sketches one motivation for preferring
perfect 2-actuality at a time and permanently over perfect 2-actuality
only over time.18 He writes that "nobody who believes the Christian
revelation can seriously imagine that those who see God face to face
can have anything more to want . • . the only thing that will put an
end to the restless striving of human beings is the vision of God"
(p. 33). He then claims that we can make sense of this on the basis of
something Bertrand Russell once argued.19 In one section of the pas^
sage Donagan refers to, Russell says this: "The primitive non-cognitive
element in desire seems to be a push. . . . Certain sensations and
other mental occurrences have a property which we call discomfort;
these cause such bodily movements as are likely to lead to their cessa-
tion" (p. 38). The cessation, however, is only temporary, and so the
striving for satisfaction must continue. Perfect 2-actuality only over
time does not solve this problem (if it is a problem), because one
achieves perfect 2-actuality over time as a result (if Russell is right) of
recurrent pain that drives one on to the next satisfaction. Perfect
2-actuality over time does not provide a way to avoid the pain of
continual desire: while I satisfy one desire, the other desires ache to be
satisfied. On the contrary, if one is perfectly 2-actual at a time, then at
that time, one has none of those pushes and so (if Russell is right)
none of the discomfort mentioned. This would be a clear reason to
prefer the latter over the former if such continual striving is a problem
that we should want to solve. To decide this we must decide which is
better: continual striving, or the state that results from successfully
curing the striving.
In the same place Russell describes the cured state in this way:
"When the discomfort ceases, or even when it appreciably diminishes,
18. Alan Donagan, Human Ends and Human Actions: An Exploration in St. Thomas's
Treatment (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1985). Page references are given
parenthetically in the body.
19. Donagan refers to Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind (London: George
Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1921). Page references are given parenthetically in the body.
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we have sensations possessing a property which we call pleasure." If
this is all there is to recommend perfect 2'actuality at some time, and
Aquinas chooses it for this reason, then Aquinas turns out to be a
hedonist. He would have to accept that our ultimate end is simply to
be in the state of having satisfied all the desires one happens to have.
But Aquinas clearly rejects this hedonism,20 so Donagan does well not
to attribute this part of Russell to Aquinas.
Donagan does point out part of Aquinas's motivation:21 as long as
we are still desiring things, there are still things that we take to be
goods and which we lack—at least we lack them when we desire
them.22 To avoid the hedonism he rejects, Aquinas must avoid mak'
ing the connection Russell makes between desire^satisfaction and plea-
sure. On the plain desire-satisfaction view of happiness, what there is
to recommend happiness to us is that it is the state in which all our
desires have been brought to rest. Rest comes, not, as Schopenhauer
would have it, by ceasing to have desires (without satisfying them),
but by fulfilling all one's desires. On this view of happiness, perfect
2-actuality at some time (permanently or impermanently) is to be
preferred to perfect 2-actuality only over time because in the latter,
one never achieves the state of having all of one's desires simultane-
ously at rest.
This view is open to an Aristotelian objection. We are social ani-
mals by nature, and so our happiness must consist in the laborious
process of exercising our potentialities over time in community with
others here in our animal bodies. Aristotle might admit that Aquinas
has shown that (1) there is another type of happiness, and that
(2) this other type of happiness has a better claim on being called
"complete," but Aristotle would deny that we can, even theoretically,
be happy in that way. Perhaps there is some being whose happiness
would not be complete if it were living a life like mine, but that does
not tell me that my happiness is not complete.
20. See EN 1.5.1095bl4-22, 10.6.1176b9-1177all; and EA 1.5 nos. 56-61,
10.9 nos. 2071-2079.
21. Compare ST 1—2.5.8 where Aquinas says that "to desire happiness is nothing
else than to desire that one's will be satisfied." See also 1—2.4.5 ad 5, and 1-2.3.8,
where he says that "man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him
to desire and seek."
22. If we achieved what we desired, then we would no longer be desiring it, we
would be enjoying it; cf. ST 1—2.11.3.
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THE ROOT OF THE DIFFERENCE
Aquinas deals with this at ST 1-2.188.8 ad 5 by arguing
that we don't have to remain sociable by nature.
A human being can live a solitary life in two different ways. First, as being
unable to tolerate human society . . . and this is brutish. Secondly, be-
cause he is immersed in divine things, and this is something superhuman.
Hence Aristotle says, "He who does not associate with others is either a
beast or a god," that is, a godly man.
Here we begin to get to the root of the difference between Aquinas
and Aristotle, for in the Aristotelian passage Aquinas quotes here,
Aristotle commits himself to the view that no human being can be-
come a god in the relevant sense. At EN 1166a20-22 he says: "No
one chooses [hairetai] to have all [good things] becoming another (for
as it is, the god has the good), but [one chooses good things for one-
self] being what one is" (EN 9.4 1166a20-22).23 The Greek for the
last phrase is "all' on ho ti pot' estin." The only word I have not
translated is pote. There is an ambiguity in the force of this word. It
can be just a throwaway word, not worth translating,24 or it can add a
temporal notion to a sentence.25 Depending upon what we take to be
the subject of the phrase "all' on ho ti pot' estin," the pot' may or may
not have temporal force. As I have translated the passage above, the
all' on phrase refers to the subject of hairetai at the beginning of the
quotation, and if we take it this way, there would be no sense to a
temporal force in the pot'.26
If, however, one thought that the subject of the alV on phrase were
23. Aristotle has at least good pήma facie evidence for this view. If a human being
lost the capacity of sociability, then she would lose the capacity to care about the
common good for its own sake (cf. 8.1.1155a22—28), and since every virtue aims at
the common good (because it aims at the fine, 5.1.1129bl 1—19; 3.7.1115bl 1—13),
she would lose the capacity for having any human virtue. Such a person could not
count as a human being. Because Aquinas has a different view of the common good,
he need not deny concern for the common good to a person who is no longer a social
animal by nature.
24. Compare EN 8.7.1159alO where, quite reasonably, the Latin translator simply
does not translate the pot'.
25. For example, "Athenaios tis erόtese pote ton Periclea" ("an Athenian once
asked Pericles").
26. Bywater takes the passage this way and so encloses in parentheses the clause
"for as it is, the god has the good" to make it clear that it is semantically and
syntactically separate from the all' on phrase.
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"god" in the phrase "the god has the good," there might be some
temporal force to the pot\ The Latin translation Aquinas uses takes
the pot' this way and so translates it as aliquanάo, "at any time":
"No one chooses to have all [good things] becoming another. (For as
things are, God has the good, but he always is what he is at any
time.)" While this is a possible reading of the text, it is not a likely
one, given that Aristotle in this passage is pointing out that a virtuous
person wishes goods to himself, and conceives of himself properly—he
sees that he is "most of all" his intellect (9.4.1166a23). There is
some motivation for taking the subject of alV on to be the subject of
hairetaiy and none for taking its subject to be theos. Aquinas, however,
quite reasonably follows the translation in front of him, and so makes
two mistakes. In EA 9.4 no. 1807, he infers that Aristotle's point is
this:
One wills oneself to be in the sense that that which is oneself is preserved
[conservatur]. But that which is most of all kept [conservatur] the same in its
being is God, who of course does not will any good for himself that he does
not now have, but now has in himself perfect good, and he always is what
he is at any time, because he is immutable. Now we are most like God as
regards intellect, which is incorruptible and immutable, and so the being
of any person is considered most of all in connection with intellect, and so
the virtuous man who lives entirely according to intellect and reason most
of all wills that he himself be and live. He also wills that he be and live as
regards what is lasting in him, but anyone who wills that he be and live
primarily as regards the body, which is subject to change, does not truly
will that he be and live.
This reading yields two mistakes: (1) it gives Aquinas some positive
reason for thinking that Aristotle believed perfect human happiness
could consist solely in the contemplative life; (2) it prevents Aquinas
from seeing that in this passage Aristotle is ruling out the possibility
that a human being could become a god (or a separate intellect).
The second place at which Aristotle commits himself to the view
that no human being can become a god is at EN 8.7.1159a3—12.
Aristotle asks if one wishes the greatest good to one's friend, namely,
that the friend be a god. He answers negatively. To wish good to one's
friend, one's friend must remain who he is (1159alO). One's (human)
friend cannot be a god, so one cannot wish the greatest good for
one's friend.
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Since Aquinas thinks that one's friend could become a god,27
how can he interpret Aristotle's claim that one wishes good to one's
(human) friend only insofar as he is human? First he points out that
if one's friend becomes a god, then one's friend would no longer
have friends, since gods have no friends (EN 8.7.1159a7-8; EA
8.7 no. 1636). But if one's friend changed and ceased to have friends,
one would lose his friendship and so would lose a friend. But since
one loves oneself most of all, one will not wish the greatest good
for one's friend at the cost of the loss of a lesser good to oneself (EA
8.7 no. 1638).
This interpretation makes Aristotle sound uncharacteristically self'
centered, especially in view of his claim at 9.8 (1169al8-20) that a
virtuous person would be willing to die for friends and country if need
be. Aquinas is well aware of the ways in which Aristotle thinks a
virtuous person will be self-sacrificing,28 but he points out in his
comment on the passage that the sacrifice is still for the sake of a
greater good for oneself (EA 9.9 no. 1878). This sort of self-sacrificing
is theoretically consistent, therefore, with Aquinas's interpretation of
EN 8.7, since both assume that the goods one wishes others are lim-
ited by what is in one's own self-interest. They are not in perfect har-
mony, however. If there are some circumstances in which you will
give your life for a friend, why might you not wish your friend to
become a god even if that would deprive you of friendship with the
other? This difficulty by itself does not rule out Aquinas's interpreta-
tion of EN 8.7, since he can take it as a description of how friendships
27. The first hint we have that something has gone wrong in Aquinas is that while
the greatest good according to Aristotle (both in the Greek and the Latin translation)
is to be [a] god (Il59a7), Aquinas says the greatest good is to be [a] god, or [a] king, or
most virtuous. Perhaps Aquinas makes these additions on the grounds that the pagans
ascribe some sort of immortality or divinity to great individuals. For a summary of how
Aquinas deals with Aristotle's skeptical remarks in the EN about immortality, see
Harry V. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1952), pp. 146-148.
28. It is interesting to notice that where Aristotle says that under certain circum-
stances a virtuous person would be willing to die for his friends and country (tes
patridos), the Latin translation Aquinas uses (at least most of the time) replaces tes
patridos with pati, "suffer," making the claim that "one will do and suffer many things
for one's friends." In his comment, however, Aquinas is faithful to Aristotle, saying
that "one would do many things for friends and country [patriae]."
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normally do operate. Normally one covets a valued friend and is
sorrowed to some degree at the thought of losing the friend, even if
that means the friend would be better off.
What we must notice about Aquinas's interpretation of EN 8.7 is
that by assuming that being a god and being most virtuous are rele-
vantly similar for his purposes, Aquinas gains further evidence that
Aristotle took seriously the idea that a human being could become a
separate intellect. Thus he fails again to learn that Aristotle did not
take this seriously. So according to Aquinas's Aristotle, we are signifi-
cantly far from being completely happy if we are leading an active life
in accordance with the virtues of magnificence, magnanimity, gener-
osity, and so on. If we become "gods" and lead a secluded contempla-
tive life, however, we lead a life which is very nearly completely
happy.29
Perhaps the most obvious objection to raise against this view is that
while contemplation of the truth might count as complete happiness
for a purely intellectual being, it cannot count as complete happiness
for a rational animal with a compound nature, especially if happi-
ness is the fulfillment of one's specifying capacities. Aquinas himself
raises this objection (EA 10.11 nos. 2105-2106). He quotes Aristotle
as claiming that "it would be absurd if one were to choose to live not
in accordance with a life proper to oneself but in accord with a life
[proper] to something else" (no. 2109). Indeed, it would be even
stranger if one's happiness consisted in the fulfillment of a life not
proper to oneself.
But these words are part of Aquinas's defense. Intellect is that
which is most fundamental (principalissimum) in human beings (EA
10.11 no. 2110; 10.12 no. 2116; 10.13 nos. 2135-2136), and so the
life most appropriate for a human being is the life of intellectual
activity (10.11 nos. 2105-2110).30 This answer will not work, how-
29. Aquinas does claim that Aristotle accepts the view that no recognizably
human life can be truly happy at EA 1.9 no. 113; 1.10 no. 129; 10.11 nos. 2102-
2116.
30. Aquinas does not advocate the secluded, contemplative life except in peculiar
circumstances (see ST 2-2.188.8), for he does not even think that in this life we can
attain true contemplative happiness. Thinking we could was a mistake of Averroes's
that Aquinas is eager to defeat; for Aquinas, true happiness can be attained only in
the beatific vision after death. For Averroes's position, see Commentarium magnum in
Aristotelis De anima libros 3.36 (edited by F. S. Crawford [Cambridge, Mass.: The
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ever, if the intellect that we are fundamentally is our practical intel^
lect, the rational faculty that guides our active life. Aquinas notices
that Aristotle sometimes seems to be suggesting that it is our specula^
tive intellect which we are fundamentally (EN 10.7.1177al5, 1178a2;
compare EA 10.10 nos. 2080-2086; 10.11 nos. 2107-2110). What
Aquinas does not take to heart is that Aristotle shows, after all the
praise he has heaped upon the speculative intellect, that it is still our
practical intellect that we are fundamentally.31
Aquinas will be justified in not taking this passage to heart in this
way if he can find some passage where Aristotle makes clear that
someone who is a human being at some time may also legitimately be
considered to be not only a compound but also an intellect capable of
independent existence. In fact, he thinks he can find just such a
passage.
It is clear that prudence and moral virtue are equally related to [circa]
the composite [of body and soul]. The virtues of the composite, properly
speaking, are human in so far as a human being [homo] is composed of soul
and body. So life, [which is lived] . . . according to prudence and moral
virtue, is human, and this is called the active life. Consequently happiness
which consists in this life [i.e., in the active life] is human. But the
speculative life and speculative happiness, which are proper to the intel-
lect, are separate and divine.
Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953], pp. 479-502). For Aquinas's argument
against Averroes, see Contra gentiles 3.41-45; and Pegis, "St. Thomas and the Ni-
comachean Ethics."
31. EN 10.8.1178b5. See also EN 9.8.1168b25-1169b2, where Aristotle points
out that the admirable self-lover, the one who loves what he is most fundamentally,
loves his practical intellect. Kraut argues that in 10.7 Aristotle does accept that we
are, fundamentally, our speculative intellect (see Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good,
pp. 4 n.5, 129, 183, 184, 352 n.34). This interpretation is undercut by three things.
(1) At 1178a7, Aristotle hedges his claims about the merits of the speculative life by
adding the condition "if a human being is most of all his [speculative] intellect." If we
are most of all that which is "controlling" in us, that which represents the interests of
the whole soul, then he denies the antecedent of this conditional. (2) At 1177b26 he
points out that the speculative life is not a human life. In what follows, Aristotle
argues that we should not let this stop us from pursuing speculation. Of course this
does not entail that he thinks the purely speculative life is the best life for a human
being. (3) In 10.8 Aristotle shows that he has not lost sight of the fact that we are
human beings and hence are to be identified most of all with our practical intellects
(see especially 1178b5).
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For present purposes it is sufficient to say just this much, for a fuller
explanation would be more than is directly relevant to the issue. This
matter is treated in the third book of the On the Soul [3.4-430a22] where it
is shown that intellect is separate. So it is clear that speculative happiness
is better than, or preferable to [potior], active happiness by as much as
something separate and divine is better than, or preferable to [potior], that
which is composite and human. (EA 10.12 nos. 2115-2116)
What we must see first here is that whatever Aristotle may mean in
the relevant passage of the On the Soul, in the passage of the EN that
Aquinas is explicating here, Aristotle nowhere claims that intellect is
separate from the compound of soul and body. What Aristotle does
claim is that "the virtue of intellect is separate [from the compound]"
("he de tou nou kechόrismene," 1178a22; "Quae autem intellectus,
separata")- Of course one way that the virtues of the intellect could be
separate, i.e., capable of existence independent of the compound,
would be if they resided in a part of us that was separate from the
compound. Of course, that is not the only way in which they could
be separate. They could be separate simply in virtue of the fact that
some beings do possess them, but that those beings (gods), do not
possess bodies as we do. This latter claim does not entail that our intel-
lects are separate from the compound of soul and body unless one also
accepts that we can become "gods."32 The text does not rule out
Aquinas's interpretation, and since he needs it to defend Aristotle
against an important objection, it is reasonable for him to take it the
way he does. Even so, all things considered, the interpretation seems
incorrect.
Given his interpretation of the passage, Aquinas can claim that
Aristotle does not find it absurd to say that our true happiness consists
in living a life that is not proper to something composed of body and
soul. It is not absurd because most fundamentally what we are is an
intellect that is separate from the compound of body and soul. A life
proper to the intellect can be a life proper to us even though it is not a
life proper to something composed of body and soul.
CONCLUSION
On Aquinas's account, the happiness we can achieve in
this life is neither complete nor self-sufficient. Our happiness can
32. For this same reason one cannot show that our intellects are separate simply by
AQUINAS ON ARISTOTLE ON HAPPINESS 117
come closer to being complete and self-sufficient if we live the con-
templative life. Thus Aquinas distinguishes three types of happiness:
HI: Happiness of the active life, the happiness of the life lived
according to the moral virtues
H2: Earthly, superhuman happiness, the contemplative life of an
embodied soul that requires some external goods
H3: Superhuman happiness to the fullest extent, the beatitude
involving one's speculative intellect and one's resurrected
body33
The most perfect happiness to be attained in this life, therefore, would
be H2, a life that is as much like H3 as is possible in this life.34
The contemplative life is more self-sufficient than the active life,
on the grounds that the contemplative life requires fewer external
goods (EA 10.10 nos. 2093-2096; 10.12 nos. 2117-2120). The con-
templative life requires only the bare necessities, such as food and
drink (nos. 2093, 2117). The active life requires more. To be just,
for example, one must have other people to whom to be just, and
others with whom to cooperate in doing just acts (no. 2094). The
contemplative life, therefore, is more self-sufficient if we take self-
sufficiency in the exclusive sense.
The contemplative life is more complete than the active life on
the grounds that contemplation of the truth is its own reward. It is
not desired for the sake of anything else, while someone always ac-
quires something extra from external actions (EA 10.10 no. 2097;
10.11 nos. 2101-2104). Virtuous action usually brings honor or favor
(no. 2097). Aquinas is not saying that virtuous actions are done for
the sake of these other goods, but only that part of their attractiveness
for us is that they are the sorts of actions that yield these good results.
More importantly, all of the moral virtues are directed to the common
good which is desired because it affords the opportunity of contemplat-
ing the truth (no. 2101-2102). Hence the immediate goals of the
showing that intellect can exist independently from a compound of soul and body,
unless one also accepts that we can become "gods" in the relevant way.
33. Compare ST 1—2.69.3. Actually there are two types of H3, one without the
resurrected body and one with it (cf. ST 1-2.4.5 corp and ad 5).
34. See O. Brown, "Saint Thomas, the Philosophers, and Felicity," Laval thέolo-
gique et phίlosophique 37 (1981): 69-82, especially p. 71.
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active life are themselves desired for the sake of the contemplation of
the truth, and so the active life is not complete, and so not happy
(no. 2102).
Nothing Aquinas did in developing his interpretation is philosophic
cally suspect. Aquinas has independent reasons for thinking that it is
impossible for us to attain our ultimate end in this life. As a sympa^
the tic interpreter of Aristotle, he will not attribute what he takes to be
a false view to Aristotle if he can find some textual grounds for at-
tributing to him what he takes to be the true view. In the interpreta-
tions we have just seen, as well as passages about the contemplative
life in EN 10, Aquinas's interpretation is certainly motivated. In fact,
in his interpretation of EN 9.4 (1166a20-22), we saw that he had the
best translation of the text in front of him, but unfortunately the Latin
translator made an important mistake. Aquinas does have to do quite
a bit of work to make his interpretation cohere with everything Aris-
totle says, but we have not seen him make any illegitimate moves in
defending his interpretation, and, given the state of the text, any good
interpretation will encounter many textual difficulties.35
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35. For more on the question of whether Aquinas's commentary is philosophically
suspect, see Joseph Owens, "Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator," in St. Thomas
Aquinas, 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies (Toronto: PIMS, 1974), pp. 213-238.
We have also seen enough to argue against Gilson that if Aquinas's commentaries on
Aristotle are merely expositions of Aristotle's doctrines, that is not incompatible with
their also being expositions of his own philosophy. See Etienne Gilson, History of
Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 367. I am
deeply indebted to Normann Kretzmann and to Terence Irwin for helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this paper.
